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Sanctioning
Lucas Miotto
University of Edinburgh, Law School, Edinburgh, UK
ABSTRACT
Up until recently, most legal philosophers have argued that an
action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, (i) its performance
brings about unwelcome consequences to the targets, and (ii) it is
performed as a response to the breach of a duty. In this paper I
take issue with this account. I first add some qualifications to it in
order to present it in its most plausible form. After doing this, I
advance a series of hypothetical cases which suggests that this
account fails. I then propose a new account of sanctioning,
whereby an action is a token of sanctioning if, and only if, it is
performed in an appropriate context and is apt for punishing
wrongdoers.
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That legal authorities impose sanctions on subjects that contravene the law is one of the
reasons most often invoked to argue that legal systems are coercive. The sanctioning1 of
subjects is widely accepted as ubiquitous in the practice of legal authorities. At times,
even stronger claims are made. It is not uncommon to hear philosophers claiming that
sanctioning is central to the efficacy of legal systems, or—even though much less
common nowadays—that it is conceptually necessary for the very existence of legal
systems. Despite expressing different ideas about sanctioning and legal systems, these
claims presuppose something in common: that we know what sanctioning actually is. It
is undoubtedly the case that we can sometimes identify examples: an authority is certainly
sanctioning when it sentences a murderer to life-imprisonment. But some cases are a bit
more puzzling. Is an authority sanctioning when it orders someone to pay compensation
for spitting in someone else’s face in public? How about when an authority orders the
recall of a number of cars that have been sold with a hidden defect, the presence of
which is known by the automotive manufacturer? And what if an authority orders a musi-
cian to stop playing loudly at night given recurrent complaints in the neighbourhood? This
lack of clarity about cases may prevent us to fully assess the extent in which legal systems
rely on sanctioning and the role sanctioning plays in legal practice.
Legal philosophers have proposed various accounts to determine when an action is a
token of sanctioning.2 Traditionally, an action has been considered a token of sanctioning
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Lucas Miotto l.miotto-lopes@sms.ed.ac.uk
1‘Sanctioning’ also has a positive meaning. It can mean ‘giving approval or effect’. In the paper, however, I only use the
word with its negative connotation; it refers to the action of imposing a sanction.
2In the paper I take sanctioning to be a type of action. That is why I will often use the phrase ‘token of sanctioning’ to refer
to those actions that belong to that type of action. Sometimes, depending upon the context and the point being made I
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if, and only if, three conditions obtain: (i) its performance imposes unwelcome conse-
quences on the targets,3 (ii) it is performed as a response to a breach of a duty and (iii)
it aims to discourage behaviour.4 Some philosophers have—correctly, in my view—criti-
cised this account in relatively recent works.5 Condition (iii), they submit, is not a necess-
ary condition: many actions that plausibly count as sanctioning are not aimed at
discouraging behaviour. As an alternative, they have proposed that we’d be better off stick-
ing to (i) and (ii): sanctioning is an action the performance of which is unwelcome to the
target and is performed as a response to the target’s breach of a duty.
It is my claim that, despite capturing important elements of the nature of sanctioning,
this latter account is over-inclusive; ultimately, it classifies certain actions as sanctioning
despite there being overriding reasons why such actions should not be classified as
such. My goal in this paper is to propose an alternative account of sanctioning that
avoids this problem.6 The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 1, I qualify the
account that characterises sanctioning as a combination of (i) and (ii) in order to
present it in its most plausible form. I call the qualified account ‘(S1)’. In this same
section, I highlight some virtues of (S1) and present hypothetical cases to raise some
doubts about its plausibility. In section 2, I propose a new account of sanctioning that
retains (S1)’s plausibility and is immune to the concerns raised against (S1). Towards
the end, I briefly highlight some advantages of adopting this new account.
1. Sanctioning: unwelcome and performed as a response to wrongdoing
As already noted above, some philosophers have proposed that an action counts as sanc-
tioning if, and only if, (i) its performance brings about unwelcome consequences to the
targets and (ii) it is performed as a response to the breach of a duty.7
One may already ask in regard to (i): what is the relevant baseline against which to
assess whether the consequences are unwelcome? At first glance, two candidate baselines
stand out: (1) the state of affairs prior to the breach; and (2) the state of affairs prior to the
application of the consequence. According to (1), a consequence is unwelcome if, and only
if, it makes the target worse off than she was prior to the breach. According to (2), the
consequence is unwelcome if, and only if, it makes the target worse off than she was
before suffering the consequence. On further reflection, however, neither of these baselines
also use phrases such as ‘an action is an example of sanctioning’, ‘an action counts as sanctioning’ or ‘an action is sanc-
tioning’. I intend all of them to effectively mean the same thing: that a particular action is a token of sanctioning.
3Some people refer to it as an ‘evil’, which sounds stronger than ‘unwelcome’.
4This view is influenced by Jeremy Bentham who held that sanctions are those measures imposed to motivate compliance.
See, Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (HLA Hart and Frederick Rosen eds, Athlone Press 1970) 134–6 (where he even
regards rewarding as sanctioning). Perhaps the most explicit defence of this account can be found in Hans Oberdiek, ‘The
Role of Sanctions and Coercion in Understanding Law and Legal Systems’ (1976) 21 American Journal of Jurisprudence 71,
75–79. Joseph Raz seems also to hold this account: see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford University Press
1999) 160.
5See Grant Lamond, ‘The Coerciveness of Law’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39, 58–59. See also Ekow N Yankah,
‘The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms’ (2007) 42 University of Richmond Law Review 1195, n 80.
6Despite the examples of sanctioning discussed in the paper being all from the legal domain, the account of sanctioning I
propose can be easily extended to sanctioning outside the legal domain.
7Grant Lamond (n 5) 58, for instance, claims that ‘sanctions are disadvantages which are prescribed for the breach of a duty’,
which suggests that he defends the view on sanctioning currently under consideration A similar view is endorsed by John
Austin: ‘The evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed or (to use an equivalent expression) in
case a duty be broken, is frequently called a sanction’: John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid
Rumble ed, Cambridge University Press 1995) 22.
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is satisfactory. Here is one example that illustrates why (1) is problematic: imagine two
salespersons are competing to close a multi-million-pound deal with a company.
Whoever gets to the company’s office first will close the deal and receive a sales bonus.
In order to arrive first, one of the salespersons drives significantly above the speed
limit. As a result, she arrives first, closes the deal, and receives a hundred thousand
pounds as a bonus. However, in response to her reckless driving, a substantial fine (of a
thousand pounds) is applied. If (1) comprises our baseline, we must conclude that auth-
orities are not sanctioning the salesperson when they impose this fine because this conse-
quence doesn’t make her worse off than she was prior to the breach of the law (were it not
for the breach, the deal wouldn’t be closed and she wouldn’t receive the bonus). More than
that, according to (1), the application of a fine would be regarded a case of sanctioning in
this scenario only if above a hundred thousand pounds. That is too demanding.
Setting the baseline as (2) also has problems. In some cases, sanctioning frees someone
from a heavier burden. Imagine that a company is violating their employees’ rights by not
paying all legally required benefits. As a result, the company suffers heavy pressure from
labour unions, and their own employees—in protest—reduce their productivity (which
decreases the company’s revenues). By being ordered to both pay the benefits to its
employees and a fine, the pressure ceases and the workers resume their normal activity,
which makes the company better off than it was prior to the application of this
consequence.
Even though it might be possible to work out these baselines to circumvent these pro-
blems, it is better and simpler to adopt a different view: a consequence is unwelcome when
most people are disposed to believe that it is unpleasant, undesirable or detrimental to
those who bear it. Regardless of the fine not being sufficient to render the salesperson
worse off than she was prior to the breach, many would usually assume that she would
rather not pay the fine if she had the chance. The same can be said about the company.
The proposed baseline has the advantage of avoiding the problems raised against previous
baseline approaches without the loss of explanatory power. On top of that, according to
this proposed view, sanctioning involves bringing about a consequence a given community
takes to be unwelcome, which helps vindicating the common intuition that one can be
sanctioned despite having idiosyncratic preferences: the masochist who regards corporal
punishment as welcome is still being sanctioned in the event authorities order the inflic-
tion of corporal punishment upon him.8
Some further qualifications are called for. There is reason not to characterise sanction-
ing as an action performed as a response to the breach of a duty. For starters, we need to
qualify ‘duty’. Are we talking about moral duties? If yes, then the view is implausible, for
there certainly are actions most people would consider as sanctioning even if not being
performed in response to the breach of a moral duty (e.g. applying a fine in response to
jaywalking). So, probably ‘duty’ must also encompass ‘institutional duties’ (which would
include legal duties). However, articulating the content of ‘duty’ in this manner is not
devoid of problems. Sanctioning, arguably, occurs most prominently in the domain of
criminal law. And characterising sanctioning as a response to a breach of a moral or an
8It is important to point out, however, that when the consequence turns out to be considered as welcome by the target,
some people may claim that it won’t be the sort of sanction capable of coercing. See Lamond (n 5) 60; Yankah (n 5) 1216–
7; Oberdiek (n 4) 88–89.
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institutional duty is at odds with what some philosophers of criminal law defend. Some of
them reject that individual criminal laws prescribe duties, prohibit conduct or command
subjects; instead, so they maintain, individual criminal laws merely communicate the
wrongfulness of certain types of conduct or define what constitutes a criminal offense;
they merely give reasons for action.9 From this view, it follows that when one breaches
an individual criminal law, one does not breach an institutional duty (i.e. a legal
duty).10 Be this as it may, these philosophers wouldn’t resile from the claim that sanction-
ing occurs in the domain of criminal law. As a result, they would reject an account that
requires sanctioning to be an action performed as a response to the breach of a duty.
An account of sanctioning need not, and therefore should not, adjudicate between com-
peting theories of criminal laws. It is safer to be as ecumenical as possible, lest the plausibility
of the account suffer. Accordingly, substituting the phrase ‘response to wrongdoing’ for
‘response to the breach of a legal duty’ is the most ecumenical option. ‘Response to wrong-
doing’ is broad enough to include breaches of institutional duties, and is consistent with
theories of criminal law that reject viewing individual criminal laws as imposing duties.
‘Response to wrongdoing’ also calls for some qualification. To say of an action that it is
a response to wrongdoing is to say that the occurrence of wrongdoing is both a reason and
a condition for performing the action. Additionally, to be a response to wrongdoing the
action must be performed by someone—normally an authority—who has a duty or is at
liberty to perform the action in case the wrongful state of affairs obtains.11 In the legal
context, an action is a response to wrongdoing when the occurrence of a legally specified
state of affairs is, according to the law, a reason and a condition for someone—normally
a legal authority—to be at liberty or duty to perform a legally specified action.12
As for the meaning of ‘wrongdoing’, this term refers here to an action that is, according
to a normative point of view, wrongfully performed. In the legal domain, for example, the
action must be wrongfully performed according to the legal point of view.13 Performing the
action, therefore, may or may not be morally wrongful.14 This latter qualification is par-
ticularly important if we want—as I think advocates of this view do—to consider as
examples of sanctioning those cases in which authorities impose an unwelcome
measure upon those who perform the so-called mala prohibita conduct (e.g. jaywalking).
9See e.g. Anthony Honoré, ‘Real Laws’ in PM Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA
Hart (Clarendon Press 1977) 117–18; RA Duff, ‘Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings’ in Stephen Shute and AP Simester (eds),
Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (Oxford University Press 2002) 53.
10And given that some of those breaches aren’t breaches of moral duties, it would follow that there are cases where neither
a moral, nor an institutional duty are broken.
11For simplicity’s sake, I am not considering cases where an action will be performed in case wrongdoing occurs. Although
this expresses something slightly different from cases where the action shall or may be performed in case wrongdoing
occurs and arguably satisfies at least one sense of ‘response’, cases where an action will be performed if wrongdoing
occurs are only relevant to our discussion when the person who performs the action is either at liberty to perform it
or has a duty to perform it.
12Sometimes, however, authorities are mistaken about whether the state of affairs have really obtained. All evidence avail-
able may be sufficient to warrant their judgment that the legally specified state of affairs have obtained, and yet it might
not have. As a result, authorities may perform an action in response to the legally specified state of affairs they believe to
have obtained. Those cases are still cases where authorities are performing an action as a response. Nevertheless, it is not
plausible to consider as responses those actions authorities perform without relying upon any evidence of the occurrence
of the legally specified state of affairs. In this latter case, it is simply arbitrary to perform these actions.
13I take the phrase to refer to the point of view of the legal institution in place, i.e. the legal system. The legal point of view,
in other words, is an institutional point of view.
14Even natural law theorists can agree with this, as they allow for bad laws to be part of the legal system as well as for the
possibility of authorities being mistaken as to the real moral status of some legal norm considered part of the institutional
framework.
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Given the qualifications above, we can restate this account of sanctioning as follows:
(S1) Sanctioning is an action15 (i*) the performance of which is commonly regarded as being
unwelcome to the target, and (ii*) is performed as a response to wrongdoing.16
Formulated in this manner, (S1) seems to do fairly well. Cases commonly viewed as sanc-
tioning do satisfy (S1). Think of the example given in the introduction: authorities sen-
tence a murderer to life-imprisonment. Life-imprisonment is certainly something
unwelcome. On top of that, provided authorities have sentenced the murderer in virtue
of murdering and that murdering is a wrong, the action is performed as a response to
wrongdoing. Similar things can be said about other cases commonly seen as sanctioning.
So long as an action satisfies (i*) and (ii*), there is, according to (S1), no further
restriction placed on it that must be met for it to constitute a sanction. Indeed, virtually
any action could be seen as sanctioning provided that the conditions are met. The most
common and telling examples of those actions are the ordering of incarceration or cor-
poral punishment, and the imposition of fines. But nothing, according to this account,
prevents considering an order for someone to carry out community service, the with-
holding of benefits, the imposition of a restraining order, or ‘the deprivation of legal
rights and status’17 as sanctioning when they satisfy the conditions of (S1). The
actions, according to (S1), need not belong to a particular branch of law, nor do they
need to have a particular aim; they can, for instance, have the aim of discouraging
behaviour, preventing further harm from occurring (as is the case with restraining
orders), or imposing punishment; indeed, the action may even possess several aims at
once. That seems a good result.
Even though (S1) places no further restrictions upon the kind of action which can be
considered a token of sanctioning, (S1) is able to separate tokens of sanctioning from some
actions that, despite resembling sanctioning to a certain extent, are not plausibly regarded
as such. Take, for instance, actions generally considered as the order to pay taxes (hence-
forth ‘taxing’). Here is an example: authorities order a merchant to pay taxes for selling
fish. The order is unwelcome to the merchant: it makes him give some of his money
away. The order, moreover, is made in response to a legally specified state of affairs,
namely fish being sold. Still, it would be odd to classify this order to pay taxes as an
example of sanctioning. (S1) vindicates this intuition. It is odd to classify this action-
token as sanctioning, for the authorities’ order was not made in response to wrongdoing.
Assuming most paradigmatic cases of taxing are significantly similar to the fish case, it
seems that (S1) is capable of isolating sanctioning from them. In fact, judges usually dis-
tinguish tokens of sanctioning from most tokens of taxing based on the same criteria—and
this reinforces the claim that (S1) has an intuitive appeal.18
15Omissions can also be included.
16I think a charitable interpretation of what Grant Lamond has claimed would allow us to conclude that he actually
endorses something very close to (S1). Despite his explicit characterisation of sanctioning involving the phrase
‘breach of a duty’, at times what he says seems to suggest that he means something very close to my ‘response to wrong-
doing’: see e.g. Lamond (n 5) 43, 59.
17Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System (Oxford University Press 1980)
150.
18See for instance National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US (2012), 183 L Ed 2d 450, 132 SCt 2566, for
the contrast between taxes and penalties––the latter seems to be used as something semantically close to ‘sanctions’.
Citing a previous decision, the Supreme Court said: ‘In distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that ‘if
the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission’: ibid 37 (emphasis mine).
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Most philosophers would accept that sanctioning and nullifying are different action-
types.19 (S1) supports this view. Declaring a contract null for its lack of consideration is
an example of a case where authorities are merely nullifying. Even though the nullification
may be unwelcome to someone who has her contract nullified—she may, for example, lose
a good bargain as a result—advocates of (S1) wouldn’t consider it as sanctioning. Two
differences stand out: first, it is not made in response to wrongdoing. Second, sometimes
the nullification doesn’t bring about any change in people’s normative positions; an auth-
ority who nullifies a contract is sometimes just announcing that, according to the law, the
contract has never existed and, thus, has never created any rights and duties. This is not to
say, of course, that some case of nullifying cannot be a case of sanctioning: the general
types are different, but some tokens may coincide.
Furthermore, (S1) can also vindicate the intuition that holds that when authorities
merely remove or suspend subjects’ powers they are not thereby necessarily sanctioning
subjects. Suspending a police investigator from investigating a case is an example where
authorities are simply suspending a power. And regardless of this action being probably
unwelcome to the investigator—she might have an interest in being the one who solves
the case—because it is not made as a response to wrongdoing, (S1) wouldn’t consider it
as sanctioning.
What I’ve said above about (S1) being able to distinguish cases of sanctioning from
cases where authorities are taxing, nullifying and suspending or removing powers
doesn’t suggest that (S1) implies that if an action is a token of sanctioning, then it is necess-
arily not a token of, say, taxing. That view would be misguided: nothing prevents a single
action from being simultaneously a token of sanctioning and taxing (or other action type).
1.1. Objection
Alas, (S1) cannot hold its intuitive appeal everywhere. Below I will advance a series of
hypothetical cases to show that. Before doing so, I need to say something briefly about
my use of hypotheticals in the discussion. To begin, the hypotheticals shouldn’t be seen
as an attempt to give knock-down arguments against (S1). I won’t defend that we
should reject (S1) solely in virtue of it failing to vindicate the intuitions pumped by the
hypotheticals. Intuitions vary and are not always reliable. As some say, one person’s
Modus Ponens is another’s Modus Tollens. In fact, despite not articulating the reasons
why, advocates of (S1) as well as those of rival accounts have considered cases similar
to the hypotheticals that I will present as sanctioning.20 The purpose of the hypotheticals
is to raise some doubts about (S1)’s plausibility. They will simply show that—at least to
some people—(S1) occasionally lacks intuitive appeal. Be this as it may, by raising
doubts about (S1)’s plausibility the hypotheticals can still be helpful. By causing—in
some people—some discomfort regarding the plausibility of (S1), these hypotheticals
may motivate these people to start looking for alternatives views and compare them
with (S1). That is what I will do. I will later propose a new account of sanctioning and
Some philosophers also rely on this aspect to distinguish sanctioning from taxing. See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law
(Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 39.
19Frederick Schauer is a recent exception. He considers some nullities as sanctions: see Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law
(Harvard University Press 2015) 28–30. However, he does so by characterising sanctions as whatever ‘law imposes in the
event of noncompliance with legal mandates’ (ibid 129), which is a quite broad, and unhelpful, characterisation.
20See e.g. Grant Lamond, ‘The Coerciveness of Law’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39, 60.
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offer some reasons to replace (S1) with this new account. But I won’t argue that this new
account should be adopted simply because it is consistent with the intuitions pumped by
the hypotheticals presented here in this section.
Additionally, the hypotheticals may be of particular importance to those who defend (S1).
If anything, by highlighting precisely what aspects of (S1) generate controversy, the hypothe-
ticals can give reasons for advocates of (S1) to clarify these aspects. Faced with the hypothe-
ticals, advocates of (S1) may have reasons to add some qualifications to their view and
attempt to explain why the hypotheticals don’t threaten their theory (in case they don’t).
Thus, even if advocates of (S1) don’t accept the account I will propose later in this paper,
the hypotheticals offered here will still serve to, as it were, impose a burden of clarification
on advocates of (S1). All in all, the hypotheticals help the discussion moving forward.
Understood in this rather thin sense, the use of the hypotheticals doesn’t raise the meth-
odological concerns typically associated with the appeal to intuitions as evidence. Indeed,
as mentioned in the introduction, some philosophers have come to defend a version of
(S1) due to being unsatisfied with a previous account of sanctioning that required
actions to be aimed at discouraging behaviour in order to be tokens of sanctioning.
And philosophers have expressed their discontentment with this past account by initially
presenting hypotheticals in which actions looked like sanctioning but weren’t aimed at dis-
couraging behaviour.21 It would be inconsistent for them now to consider a similar move
against their own account as illegitimate.22
Here is the first hypothetical, which I will name ‘(Car)’ to facilitate further reference:
Imagine that a thief has stolen a car in a jurisdiction where stealing a car is a wrong. Apart
from having the car stolen, the car owner didn’t experience any further loss, inconvenience or
nuisance as a result of the theft. Authorities find the thief who is responsible for the wrong-
doing and solely order her to return the car to the owner.23
Ordering the return of the car to the owner would, according to (S1), be a token of sanc-
tioning: the order is unwelcome to the target (the car thief), and it is made as a response to
the thief’s wrongdoing. Yet, considering the action authorities performed in (Car) as an
instance of sanctioning doesn’t look right.
To help see why, let me try a variation of this example that allows for a better compari-
son between the action performed by authorities in (Car) and a clearer case of sanctioning.
Being creative, I’ll call the variation ‘(Car 2)’. (Car 2) is a case that is identical to (Car) in
every respect except for what the authorities do. The authorities in (Car 2) perform two
separate actions: they order the thief to return the car to the victim, and they order her
to spend some time in jail.24 Despite both actions meeting (S1)’s requirements, the
second action is no doubt a token of sanctioning, whereas the first is not clearly so.
In (Car 2) the two actions are performed by authorities in response to the same wrong-
doing: stealing the car. So, the implausibility of considering one of the orders as
21See ibid 58–59; Ekow N Yankah, ‘The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms’ (2007) 42 University of Richmond
Law Review 1195, n 80.
22The move is similar in respect to its reliance on hypotheticals to raise some doubts about a given theory.
23The example does presuppose that it is at least possible to have a legal system in place where ordering someone to
returning a stolen good is the sole response to stealing (which is a wrongdoing). I’m aware that, in most jurisdictions,
legal authorities wouldn’t probably solely order the thief to return the car if it was proven that the thief had stolen it.
24I have omitted the steps that would lead from the wrongdoing to being sentenced to prison purely for the sake of con-
venience, as nothing relevant to the discussion turns on them.
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sanctioning cannot be explained by any sort of qualitative difference in the wrongs to
which the actions figure as responses.25 Maybe, then, it is the fact that there is a difference
in the degree to which the actions are unwelcome to the thief that makes it implausible to
consider them both as tokens of sanctioning? It is true that being sent to jail and being
ordered to return a car are unwelcome to a different extent. Usually, the former is generally
considered to be far more unwelcome to the thief than the latter.
This explanation, however, doesn’t take us very far. The difference in the degree to
which the actions are unwelcome is irrelevant as to why it may seem implausible to
regard both actions as sanctioning. To see why, let’s again slightly alter the example in
such a way that authorities perform actions equally unwelcome to the thief. Call it
‘(Car 3)’: (Car 3) is also identical to (Car) in every respect except that authorities
perform two separate actions: they order the thief to pay what the car is worth (in
money) to the victim, and authorities order the thief to pay exactly the same amount of
money to the state. Since the sum of money required by the two orders is the same,
there is no margin for a difference in the degree the actions are unwelcome here. If
giving away a sum of money is unwelcome, it is equally unwelcome in both cases.26
Yet, the second order still looks like sanctioning, whereas the first doesn’t. Why is that?
2. Sanctioning: a new account
As we have seen, despite satisfying the conditions set forth by (S1), it is not entirely clear
that we should consider the following actions as tokens of sanctioning: ordering the thief
to return the car to the victim (as in (Car) and (Car 2)) and ordering the thief to pay to the
victim what the car was worth (as in (Car 3)). I have already dismissed two potential expla-
nations as to why some may think it is implausible to consider such actions as sanctioning:
there is no qualitative difference in the wrongs these actions figure as a response to, and
the difference in the degree the actions are unwelcome to the thief doesn’t matter. There is,
however, one possible explanation the reader might have already thought of and I haven’t
presented: actions typically viewed as sanctioning have a punitive aim,27 whereas those
actions present in the (Car) examples which are not plausibly seen as sanctioning lack
such aim. Instead, the latter have a purely reparatory aim.
Think of the second order made by authorities in (Car 2) and (Car 3), respectively the
order for the thief to be jailed and the order for the thief to pay a sum of money to the state.
We can ask the following question about their aims: what did the legal system intend to
achieve by permitting or requiring authorities to perform these actions as a response to
stealing?28 Surely the answer can be ‘many things’. Still, at least one of the things that
25I am trying here to prevent those arguments that appeal to the distinction between public wrongs and private wrongs. If
the account of sanctioning I will propose is correct, sanctioning occurs regardless of a wrongdoing being private or public.
That, I think, is a desirable outcome; it allows us to defend that sanctioning occurs in both tort and criminal law and
avoids complications associated with the public–private distinction (if, in fact, this distinction makes sense).
26Of course given the second order is performed in addition to the first, someone might think the second is more unwel-
come: the thief will have to pay more money. If it helps, I ask the reader to consider these orders in separate contexts.
Even in separate contexts (a context in which an authority performs only one of the orders) the second order, and not the
first, seems to be sanctioning.
27In the paper I assume that ‘aim’, ‘purpose’ and ‘intention’ are all synonymous.
28I’m talking figuratively here. I’m not assuming that legal systems are agents and have desires or intentions. I ask the
reader to interpret any reference to legal systems’ intentions as referring to the intentions of the authorities who act
on behalf of legal systems. The relevant authorities here are those who have first authorised or required the performance
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comes to mind as an answer is ‘punishing wrongdoers for their wrong’. This seems to be at
least one of the numerous aims these actions have. And if we were to rank the aims accord-
ing to their salience, certainly punishing the wrongdoer would be high up in the rank.
Knowing exactly what amounts to ‘punishing’ a wrongdoer is a complicated and con-
troversial issue—one that I neither intend to, nor have space to pursue here. But that
doesn’t prevent me from offering, for the sake of the current inquiry, at least a stipulative
characterisation of what amounts to punishing a wrongdoer. Needless to say, this is not an
attempt to settle the issue of what amounts to punishment.
Punishment is a censorious practice; it ‘involves an essential element of condemna-
tion’.29 To be more systematic, we could say that: X punishes Y if, and only if, Y has com-
mitted a wrong and X, in response to Y’s wrongdoing, intentionally subjects Y to harmful
treatment30 that conveys disapproval towards Y.31
From this we can say that an action is performed with the aim of punishing if, and
only if:
(Aim of punishing): those who have chosen the action as a response to a particular wrong
have done so to subject wrongdoers to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval.
The thief, in the (Car) cases, has committed a wrong by stealing the victim’s car. It seems
that both the order for the thief to be jailed and the order for the thief to pay a sum of
money were chosen as responses to stealing by authorities who had the aim of punishing.
Authorities intended to, as it were, teach those who steal a lesson.32 That sounds like a
plausible explanation of what authorities intended to achieve by choosing these actions
as responses to stealing.
The same explanation doesn’t hold much water when it comes to expounding the aims
of those actions not plausibly seen as sanctioning in the (Car) examples, namely ordering
the thief to return the car to the victim, and ordering the thief to give the equivalent in
money to the victim. We know the thief has caused the victim a loss; she has deprived
the victim of his car. Now that the thief has stolen the victim’s car, she owes a car, or
of these actions as responses to cases similar to (Car 2) and (Car 3)––e.g. legislators. And by doing so, they might have had
some aim in mind. They might have had a conception of what performing these actions was supposed to achieve. What
the action is supposed to achieve can be contrasted with what the response is actually used to achieve (say, by law
appliers). Both reveal something about an action’s aims. The first about the supposed aim of performing an action,
and the second about the aim that one actually intends to achieve by performing the action. For our discussion, we
should focus on the aims of those who chosen these actions as responses to wrongdoing wanted to achieve by
placing them as responses. That is because this is the sort of aim that figures in the explanation of the fact that a par-
ticular action was chosen as a response to a given wrong.
29David Garland and RA Duff, ‘Introduction: Thinking About Punishment’ in David Garland and RA Duff (eds), A Reader on
Punishment (Oxford University Press 1994) 13. The idea that punishment involves condemnation was first advanced by
Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ (1965) 49 The Monist 397.
30‘Harm’ here should be interpreted broadly. It encompasses both the infliction of physical pain as well as the violation of
interests, preferences or rights. I also assume that one may be harmed without feeling or believing to be harmed. Natu-
rally, subjecting someone to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval is something unwelcome (in the way previously
specified).
31There are, of course, a number of well-developed accounts of punishment. For an account of legal punishment, see for
instance Michael J Zimmerman, The Immorality of Punishment (Broadview Press 2011) 20. For a competing account––
although also encompassing non-legal forms of punishment––see Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Ashgate
2006) 28–37.
32With this phrase I don’t presuppose that authorities are indeed aiming at re-educating those who steal. It may well be
that they were attempting to do so. But I use the phrase just to convey in different terms the fact that authorities have
aimed at censuring those who steal.
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the equivalent in money, to the victim.33 In response to the theft, authorities ordered the
thief to give back to the victim—as far as possible—what she owes to him, namely the car,
or the equivalent amount in money. Apparently, the aim of ordering the thief to return the
car or its equivalent in money is solely to make the thief give back what she owes to the
victim; i.e. to make the thief provide reparation for the losses that she has caused.34 The
orders, after all, are directing the thief to do or to pay something to the victim and the
thief is not being ordered to do or to pay anything more than she owes to the victim.
No disapproval seems to be conveyed, and hence no punishment, seems to be intended.
That might lead us to conclude that the reason why it may be implausible to consider all
actions in the (Car) examples as sanctioning is that some of these actions lack the aim of
punishing, which is a necessary condition for sanctioning. This move, however, would be
too hasty. What to say about cases that look like sanctioning but which involve orders that
are made solely to prevent further harm or further criminal activities from occurring?
Ordering the apprehension of both the drugs and the materials used to produce drugs
from someone charged with drug trafficking, or the denial of child custody in virtue of
mistreatment would be examples.35 The relevant authorities might have solely aimed to
protect society from drug trafficking, or the child from parental mistreatment when
they’ve chosen these orders as responses to drug trafficking and child mistreatment
respectively; the authorities could have been indifferent as to whether these orders sub-
jected the targets to harmful treatment or conveyed disapproval. No aim of punishing
needs to be present here.
What I’ve just said above suggests that the implausibility of considering the orders to
return a car or an equivalent to the victim as sanctioning may not arise from the
notion that sanctioning must have the aim of punishing. There is, though, an alternative
explanation: for an action to be a token of sanctioning the action must be apt for punishing
the wrongdoer. The relevant actions in the hypotheticals aren’t. So that is why it is implau-
sible to consider them as sanctioning.
By saying that an action is apt for punishing the wrongdoer I mean this:
(Aptness-test): In the appropriate context, if the action had the aim of punishing the wrong-
doer, performing it would punish the wrongdoer.
(Appropriate context): a context where the action figures as a response to wrongdoing.
The aptness-test implies that an action may be apt for punishing even if it doesn’t actually
have the aim of punishing (i.e. even if not chosen as a response to wrongdoing in order to
33There are competing explanations as to why this duty arises. For a helpful discussion, see John Gardner, ‘What Is Tort Law
For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice’ (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1; John Gardner, ‘Punishment and Compen-
sation: A Comment’ in L Cristopher Russell (ed), Fletcher Essays on Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 72–74.
34In the sense of giving to the victim, as far as possible, what the wrongdoer owes to the victim in virtue of causing the loss.
Or, as it is usually said by many: putting the victim back in the position that she would have been weren’t the wrong-
doing. In this paper, any phrase such as ‘providing reparation for the victim’s losses’ or related expressions should be
interpreted according to the sense specified in this footnote.
35These examples are adapted from Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford University Press 2014)
16 and passim. Ashworth and Zedner call this––and other similar examples––‘punitive-preventive’ orders. According to
them, despite recognising the lack of a punitive aim in such examples, courts have considered this kind of orders as
having basically the same effects as punishment and, for that reason, have subjected these actions to the same con-
straints applicable to instances of punishment. This shows that it might be useful to legal practice to group together
actions that, despite not being strictly speaking instances of punishment, generate the same effects as punishment.
As we will see, that is one consequence of the account of sanctioning I will propose.
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subject the wrongdoer to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval towards her). To see
whether an action satisfies the aptness-test we should ask counterfactually: in the appro-
priate context, if the action were elected as a response to wrongdoing in order to punish
wrongdoers, would its performance amount to punishment? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then the
action is apt for punishing. Determining whether an action is apt for punishing, thus,
involves looking at the effects the performance of an action would produce in a circum-
stance where it has the aim of punishing: the action must subject the target to harmful
treatment that conveys disapproval. Having the aim of punishing plus the effects the
action would produce if performed in the appropriate context should be jointly sufficient
to conclude that those who are performing the action are punishing the wrongdoer.36
Notice that the fact that the action would amount to punishment if the action had the
aim of punishing the wrongdoer doesn’t imply that its performance would amount to the
punishment the wrongdoer deserves. It could amount to a fair or unfair, mild or harsh,
useful or pointless form of punishment. What matters is that it would be a form of punish-
ment nonetheless.
Having characterised when an action is apt for punishing, the question now is whether
those actions in the (Car) examples which weren’t plausibly seen as sanctioning are apt for
punishing the thief. To be more specific, we need to know whether, in the appropriate
context, authorities would be punishing the thief by performing the order for the thief
to return the car to the victim and the order for the thief to pay the equivalent in
money had the relevant authorities chosen both actions as responses to stealing in
order to subject the wrongdoer to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval. The
answer is ‘No’. By performing these actions, authorities would be solely making the
thief give back what she owed to the victim, i.e. repairing the losses she has caused. In
other words, they would be just ordering the thief to perform a duty she already had.
And she had the duty to return the car since the moment she stole the car.37 With or
without the aim of punishing, simply ordering someone to give what she already owed
to the victim cannot be punishment.38 For punishing the wrongdoer it is necessary that
the action does subject the wrongdoer to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval. It
is hard to see both the order for the thief to return a car and the order for her to give
the equivalent amount in money this way.
That, however, doesn’t mean that ordering someone to repair losses can never be apt for
punishing the wrongdoer. Imagine a circumstance where the following action has the aim
of punishing: ordering the thief to personally return the car to the victim in a public cer-
emony. This process is shameful (and hence the harm) and certainly conveys disapproval
towards the wrongdoer. The same can be said about ordering someone to apologise in
public for making a false statement which affected someone else’s reputation. Even in
those cases, however, it is important to emphasise that the punishment-part lies not in
36All actions that satisfy the aptness test are actions that actually subject their targets to harmful treatment that conveys
disapproval (regardless of their aims). Actions that fail to satisfy the aptness test are those that, for whatever reason, turn
out not to subject the relevant targets to harmful treatment that conveys disapproval when so intended.
37In this sentence, ‘duty’ refers to ‘moral duty’.
38An argument to support this claim is offered by John Gardner, ‘Punishment and Compensation’ (n 33) 74–75 in his dis-
cussion of the distinction between punishment and reparatory compensation: ‘there is no way to represent punishment
as the fallback performance by the wrongdoer of the duty that he originally failed to perform. Unlike reparation, punish-
ment is not something that the wrongdoer owes. For it is not something that he can give. It is something that is inflicted
upon him by others, and the norms regulating it belong, in the final analysis, to their normative position and not to his.’
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the reparation of losses per se. Rather it lies in the way in which the losses are ordered to be
repaired. The losses are, after all, ordered to be repaired in a way that shames the wrong-
doer. Thus, had these actions the aim of punishing, they would be, given the effects pro-
duced, a form of punishment.
Aptness for punishing seems to lead us towards a new account of sanctioning. Adding
being apt for punishing the wrongdoer to (S1) makes it resistant to the worries raised with
the (Car) cases. Adding it to (S1), however, would render some of the elements of (S1)
redundant. Remember that a specific context was required for an action to be apt for pun-
ishing the wrongdoer: a context where the action is performed as a response to wrongdoing.
On top of this, it is plausible to think that all actions apt for punishing the wrongdoer are
unwelcome. To eliminate redundancies, I offer the following formulation for this new
account:
(S2) an action is a token of sanctioning if and only if, it is performed in the appropriate
context and is apt for punishing wrongdoers.
As just mentioned, (S2) is immune to the worries we raised against (S1) with the hypothe-
ticals. But more importantly, (S2) retains most, if not all, of (S1)’s intuitive appeal. We
should bear in mind that (S2) doesn’t imply that by being a token of sanctioning an
action cannot be simultaneously a token of some other action type (e.g. compensating).
That may initially sound like a reductio of (S2). After all, if there are actions that are
tokens of sanctioning and tokens of, say, compensating, then it looks as if (S2) didn’t
fulfil its job. That would be too simplistic a view. As per (S2), an action is a token of sanc-
tioning if, and only if, it is performed in the appropriate context and is apt for punishing.
But a single action may be apt for punishing and apt for doing several other things. There
is no reason to think that just because an action is a token of sanctioning it cannot be a
token of some other action type. In fact, I’ve presented two examples earlier where this
happens: the example in which the thief is ordered to return the car to the victim in a
public ceremony, and the example in which someone is ordered to apologise in public.
And we can think of many others.39 That (S2) allows for these cases to occur and yet
be considered as sanctioning is, I think, a good sign. The legal domain is generally resistant
to simplification.
2.1. Why Care?
Up until now I have only shown that (S1) fails to uphold intuitions shared by some people
and that (S2) succeeds in doing so while preserving (S1)’s virtues. As far as methodology is
concerned, I’m on safe grounds. Or, to be fair, I’m on the same methodological grounds as
advocates of (S1) are—they too use intuitions and the method of cases to raise doubts
about the plausibility of rival theories and to start making a case for their own. Yet, one
can still ask: ‘Why care about a new account of sanctioning?’; ‘Apart from vindicating
the intuitions of some people, are there any benefits in adopting an account which is
more specific than (S1)?’
It is tempting to offer the ‘I’m doing theory for theory’s sake’ kind of reply. It is true that
the plausibility of a theory does not depend upon whether people find the theory
39Think of punitive damages, for instance.
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interesting or care about the issue the theory addresses. So, perhaps the burden of replying
to such questions is a burden I don’t have. However, at the same time I don’t want to
simply dismiss or disdain such questions. This attitude won’t lead to any meaningful con-
versation with anyone who is willing to ask questions such as the ones above. And, for
starters, there is no harm or loss in having such a conversation. More fundamentally, I
think answering those questions is helpful; it helps us theorists avoid some common
traps of our own calling. As theorists, we can quibble and propose minor adjustments
to practically every theory or concept. But if what one is doing is just quibbling or
doing pedantic exercises without any meaningful theoretical or practical benefit, then
perhaps it is better to keep the exercise to oneself.
I do think criticising (S1) and proposing (S2) isn’t just a quibble about sanctioning. As
some philosophers have recently highlighted, sometimes it is important to discuss ‘which
concepts we should use in a given context’.40 This is precisely how the dispute between (S1)
and (S2) should be understood. The relevant dispute is about whether (S2)’s concept of
sanctioning is better suited than (S1)’s for legal practice and for the purposes of doing
moral, political, and legal philosophy. There are reasons to think that (S2) fares better in
comparison to (S1) in relation to these aspects. For example, if as (S1) describes, sanction-
ing is too broad a phenomenon, then addressing certain questions in moral and political
philosophy about the justification and the need for sanctioning may become quite difficult
and frustrating. (S1) makes it hard—if not impossible—to find a common justification for
all or most tokens of sanctioning. (S2) fares better in addressing these worries by virtue of
better delimiting the phenomenon (without, of course, losing track of intuitions or losing
explanatory power). The fact that all tokens of sanctioning are apt for punishing opens up
some space for one to attempt providing a common justification of tokens of sanctioning.
Moral and political philosophers commonly argue that punishment—for criminal
wrongs and otherwise—has a particular moral significance; it carries a justificatory
burden. And this burden should be (and typically is) dealt by legal systems through the
imposition of constraints for its exercise: punishment should be proportionate to the
wrong, preceded by fair trial, applied only to those who deserve it, and so on. By connect-
ing sanctioning with punishment, (S2) bundles together those actions that give rise to
similar moral concerns as punishment—namely concerns relative to the subjection of
individuals to harmful treatment and censure—and require similar justification as
punishment.
That is not all. By grouping together actions that give rise to similar moral concerns,
(S2) also seems to be more relevant to legal practice. For example, Andrew Ashworth
and Lucia Zedner have pointed out that despite recognising the lack of a punitive aim
in preventive orders, courts have considered this kind of orders as having virtually the
same effects as punishment and, for that reason, have subjected these actions to the
same constraints as are applicable to instances of punishment.41 This suggests that it
might be useful to legal practice to have a well-defined concept that groups together
40For an extensive and helpful treatment of the issue, see David Plunkett, ‘Which Concepts Should We Use? Metalinguistic
Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy’ (2015) 58 Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 828; Alexis
Burgess and David Plunkett, ‘Conceptual Ethics I’ (2013) 8 Philosophy Compass 1091; Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett,
‘Conceptual Ethics II’ (2013) 8 Philosophy Compass 1102.
41Ashworth and Zedner (n 35) ch 1, esp 15–17.
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actions that, despite not strictly being instances of punishment, generate the same effects
as punishment and deserve similar legal treatment.42 (S2) does precisely that.
Moreover, there are reasons to prefer (S2) when it comes to discussions about the
relationship between sanctioning and legal systems’ coerciveness. When, for example,
legal and political philosophers discuss the possibility of the existence of a non-coercive
legal system, they typically imagine a legal system free from sanctioning.43 Be this as it
may, they are, in general, not concerned with the possibility of there being a legal
system where authorities wouldn’t, for instance, order someone to repair a damage.
Rather, most, if not all, philosophers who discuss the topic are concerned with the possi-
bility of there being a legal system where legal authorities would, for instance, neither
threaten nor carry out a threat to subject to harmful treatment those citizens who don’t
repair a damage (or comply with any legal mandate or direct order). Thus, if we want
an account of sanctioning that is useful to discussions about the coerciveness of legal
systems, (S2) seems the way to go.
Finally, an additional—even though weaker—reason to prefer (S2) is that it supports,
and is supported by, linguistic usage.44 Take, for instance, the dictionary definition of
‘sanction’ offered by the Cambridge Dictionary: ‘a strong action taken in order to make
people obey a law or rule, or a punishment given when they do not obey.’45 (S2) is
closer to this usage than (S1). Linguistically, it makes more sense to use words such as
‘remedies’, or phrases such as ‘reparatory measures’, to describe the consequences
applied in cases such as (Car). Unsurprisingly, that is precisely what many courts and
legal scholars usually do.
It is never too clear how much one should say in response to ‘why care?’ challenges.
Regardless of whether I said enough or not, I have two hopes with the paper. The first
is that even those who think they should not care about a new account of sanctioning
and those who disagree with the proposed account may become aware of some
counter-intuitive aspects of an account of sanctioning commonly defended and perhaps
propose amendments or add new qualifications to it. My second hope is that I have
made a plausible case for viewing sanctioning as an action which is performed in the
appropriate context and is apt for punishing wrongdoers. This, however, is far from
being the end of the discussion. A series of questions have just been touched upon and
are still left open; questions about the precise relationship between sanctioning and the
use of coercion by legal systems, questions about the justification of sanctioning, and ques-
tions about the implications of this account to legal practice. As pertinent as these ques-
tions seem to be, I must leave their exploration to another occasion.
42A number of legal scholars have defended that, given their similarity, some measures usually imposed by courts in private
law cases, such as aggravated, punitive, and exemplary damages, should be subjected to the same constraints that are
applicable to some measures imposed in criminal law cases. See e.g. Allan Beever, ‘The Structure of Aggravated and
Exemplary Damages’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 87. (S2) vindicates this claim: (S2) implies that both in
(at least some) cases where authorities impose aggravated, punitive or exemplary damages, and in cases where auth-
orities are punishing someone who has committed a criminal wrong, authorities are engaged in the same activity;
namely, sanctioning.
43See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (n 4) 157–61.
44That should come as no surprise for those who accept that intuitions about cases are nothing more than linguistic
intuitions.
45See Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Sanction’ <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/sanction≥ accessed 2 April
2017.
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